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Gorbachev's Reforms and the
United States Economy
by Ronald A. Rolighed
On March 11 , 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, a new generation leader,
became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Since his elevation to power, his ideas for social reform and foreign policy
initiatives have received widespread attention from western media. While
the West applauds his new social ideas, Gorbachev is also working to
i.nplement strategic economic changes to bring the U.S.S.R. closer to the
economic levels of the West, of the United States in particular.
The struggling economy of the Soviet Union has dampened the communist spirit and raised doubts about the ability of communism to compete with capitalistic systems. Gorbachev's goal is to remain fundamentally Marxist while achieving the economic efficiency and competitiveness
of the United States. Interaction between the Soviets and the West is vital
for his reforms to work. This article examines some of the implications
of these internal reforms on relations between the two superpowers and ,
thus, their impact on the U.S. economy.

Soviet Economic Problems
Following the global economic boom that began after World War II ,
the Soviet Union was ill-equipped to adjust to economic change . As
technological advances fueled Western economic growth, the Soviet
system of centra lized planning failed to adapt to change.
Major reasons for this failure are the political and economic contradictions inherent in a system of central planning . Central economic planning in the Soviet Un ion puts the responsibility of capital allocation into
the hands of communist party ideologues who pr.o rnate political theory
over economic rationality . According to University of Il linois economics
professor Dr. James Millar, "The main problem of a social economic
system is that it can escalate the most trivial economic decision into a .
vital political decision " (1988). Concentration on political concern~ and
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objectives rather than on eco nomic co nsid eration s has restrai ned Sovi et
economi c progress .
Another difficulty with ce nt ral pl annin g is its emphas is on econ omic
isol ation . Th e Soviets adh ere to a bel ief t hat th eir econ omy shou ld be
protected from capitalistic influence. A n application of thi s view is the
Soviet poli cy of making the ruble inconvertible in international markets.
A Sovi et ruble has no valu e o utside the U .S.S .R.. Although thi s lack of
convertibility has helped protect the Soviet econom y from outside
economic influence, it has also hindered trade and tec hnologi cal exchanges . Economies such as Japan' s have demonstrated th e usefulness
of economic interaction with the United States by taking advantage of
high technology exports from the U.S .. The Soviets, in contrast, have missed out on high-technology trade and are now suffering the consequences .
The Soviet system of central planning has also had negative consequences on productivity. Since 1980, productivity of industrial capital in
the U .S.S.R. has declined at an annual rate of 4.1 % (Directorate of Intelligence, 1985, p . 63). Capital inefficiency in the Soviet Union is partly
caused by the centralized system ' s stress on quantity through a system
of quotas. Soviet industrial ministers and factory managers have traditionally been rewarded for producing more goods rather than improved goods.
A production manager who slows production by trying to implement
quality innovations risks losing his production quota bonus (Goldman ,
1985, p. 60). The emphasis on quantity goals has not only misdirected
resources but has also wasted time. It is not unusual for a plant in the
U.S .S.R. to virtually shut down once a quota has been reached and
another one not yet set.
The Soviet' s economic woes are compounded by the fact that labor
has little incentive to strive for efficiency. In 1985, productivity of the Soviet
industrial worker was only 55% that of his counterpart in the United States
(Directorate of Intelligence, 1985, p. 63). In the Soviet Union , lax production efforts pose little if any threat of unemployment. Soviet leaders
have repeatedly denounced unemployment as an intolerable aspect of
capitalist society. Although unemployment is rare in the Soviet Union,
underemployment of both natural and human resources is a serious problem . In addition, the past concentration on investment in industrial goods
has led to a relatively scarce supply of quality consumer goods. This scarcity discourages employees from striving for higher income by keeping
the standard of living relatively income neutral. A higher income does
not necessarily translate into more comfort and luxury because of the
scarcity of consumer goods.
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Gorbachev's Reforms
Gorbachev's words reflect his stress on the need for economic reforms .
He has called for: " a decisive revolution of the economy," " a deep
reconstruction of the economic mechanism ," and " a profound transformation of the economy" (Goldman, 1985, p. 58). Such statements by Gorbachev repudiate traditional economic planning.
One of Gorbachev' s first acts for economic reform w as to make new
political appointments . The chiefs of seven all-union economic ministries
were replaced immediately after Gorbachev came to power (Bergson ,
1985, p. 12). Such political appointments show that he chooses not to
tolerate the present state of inefficiency. Another way Gorbachev has
taken on the challenge of improving central planning is to experiment
with private enterprise in the agricultural economy. Farm households may
now contract to raise livestock on behalf of collective farms (Hough, 1985,
p. 44) . Experiments in agriculture may serve to test the waters for further
reform of the central planning system . It appears that Gorbachev is trying to both increase the quantity and improve the quality of goods and
services available to Soviet citizens by reforming the system of central
planning.

New Social Ideas
It can be argued that Gorbachev's new social reforms, while advertised as being focused on humanistic concerns, are based more on national
economic goals. As noted earlier, some of the major problems in the Soviet
economy are lack of work incentives and low productivity. There is a
direct correlation between the perceived quality of life and the incentive
to work. If Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost reforms can elevate the
perceived social welfare of communist society, this perception can
perhaps raise the willingness of people to improve it via hard work. New
policies such as alcohol abuse prevention, eased press policies, better
intragovernment communication , and more cordial relationshjps between
bureaucrats and proletariat could ultimately lead to improved worker incentive and productivity.
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Foreign Policy Initiatives
Gorbachev's foreign policy reform s may al so fu rth er economic objectives. The new policy with perhaps the greatest economic co nseq uen ces
is that of openness to the West . Th e new attitudes toward western
democracies suggest the Soviets plan to use international goodwi ll to supplement their internal economic advancement. New foreign policies such
as the sa le of debt issues to the West and joint indu strial efforts weaken
the traditional Soviet policy of economic isolation while, at the sa me time,
supporting Soviet economic reform . Setting aside the slight c hance that
the Soviet bureaucracy has adopted a new attitude toward its compatability with capitalism , it is not difficult to see how new foreign policies may
favorably affect Soviet economic development.
One major result of Gorbach ev's foreign policy reforms is the development of an environment that is more conducive to western eco nomic
assistance. Such assistance is of great importance to the success of Gorbachev's economic plans and , some would argue, the chief goal of recent political actions. As Gorbachev has becom e more cordial , the West
has responded by substantially increasing loan s to the Soviets. Since Gorbachev took over in 1985, total Soviet indebtedness to the West has more
than doubled ; Soviets now owe $25.9 billion to western commercial
banks, and $12 billion in trade credits backed by western governments
(Shelton, 1988, p. 20) . Such borrowings may be used to speed up industrial
reform and improvements .
Another Soviet foreign policy initiative with economic implication s is
the proposal to allow joint industrial ventures. Under most new
agreements, western companies bring new technology into the Soviet
Union in exchange for access to the Soviet market. Joint ventures with
western companies not only provide the Soviets with capital but also offer them a variety of western products that can increase their standard
of living. Hundreds of western companies have discussed possible joint
ventures with th e Soviets. Few agreements have been reached , however,
because of the complex regulations a company must follow in order to
be considered . Strict guidelines, both legal and political , make a joint venture an enormously time consuming endeavor. Gorbachev has worked
to ease these restrictions.
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Effects on the U.S. Economy
Clea rly, Gorbac hev hopes th at t he Un ited States will play a large ro le
in t he reform ation of the Sovi et economy. The qu estion now re mai ns,
" How will his pl ans affect the U .S. economy? "
A major ben efit from heightened interaction between th e Soviets and
th e U. S. is greater acces s to the Soviet market. In the past, the Am eri ca nSoviet trad e re lation ship has been slight. In 1986, o nly 1.5% of U .S. exports went to the Soviet Union , and on ly 0.2% of U.S. imports were from
th e Soviets (Becker, 1987, p. 67) . Th e market for western consumer goods
in the Soviet Union is enormous and , if expanded , could become highly
profitable for a wid e variety of U .S. industries. As noted previously, joint
industrial ventures could open the Sovi et market to U .S. busin ess. If the
legal and political barriers to such ventures continue to lessen, the chances
are good that more and more U.S. industry will expand into the vast Soviet
market.
Gorbach ev's refo rms may not only present many profit opportunities
to t he U.S., but they may also pose several dilemmas. First, if Gorbac hev' s
foreign policy initiatives and new military agendas decrease Soviet military
expenditures and diminish the Soviet military threat, they could indirectly alter the role of the military in the U.S. economy. Huge U.S. military
budgets approved as a result of the Breshnev doctine and the Afghan in vasion cou ld lose support following the Afghan withdrawal and unilateral
arms reductions . If Gorbachev' s reforms ecourage decreased U.S. military
expenditures, the U .S.S.R. ' s financial obligation to maintain military competitiveness will decrease, thus freeing resources for struggling Sovi et indu stries. If successful , Gorbachev's reforms could have enormou s con sequences for the U.S. economy, given the role of the military buildup
of the 1980's in the economic growth of the United States .
On a broader scale, if Gorbachev can succeed in making the Soviet
industrial complex more efficient, productive, and competitive, the Soviet
Union' s internal capabi lities could overwhelm the U.S. economy and
make Japan's rem arkable growth pal e in comparison. The Soviet Union
is blessed with the most abundant supply of natural resources of any nation in the world . If the Soviets efficiently tap their natural and human
resources, the United States could face yet another challenge to maintain its position in the world economy. The odds of this occurring in the
short run are small given the major challenges Gorbachev faces. If Gorbachev marks the beginning of a progressive era in the U.S.S.R. , however,
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Soviet reforms will offer a variety of opportu nities, challenges, and dilem mas to the polit ical and economi c leaders hip of the United States in the
twe nty-first century .
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